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Capital gains play an essential role in the intertemporal allocation
of resources, but they can also fuel self-ful￿lling bubbles. The simple
case of 2 "identical" capitals is analyzed in an OG model. The only
trajectory in which expectations are realized at every date is the one
in which blue machines and red machines have the same price. If ever
their prices di⁄er, then there is a "bubble" which must burst in ￿nite
time.
Key Words: bubbles, capital gains, heterogeneous capital, irre-
versible investment, overlapping generations, Tobin￿ s q
1 Introduction
Capital gains (and losses) are essential to the workings of private-ownership
economies. Changes in asset prices signal anticipated changes in relative
scarcities. Capital gains can, however, fuel self-perpetuating bubbles, some
of which will eventually burst.
￿Paper prepared for the Singapore Economic Review conference, August 4-6, 2005.
1For individuals (or corporations or universities), the capital gains on
(growth) stocks are no less income than the interest paid on bonds or the
dividends paid on (value) stocks. For individuals, the increase in wealth re-
sulting from realized or unrealized capital gains is saving just as are payroll
deductions deposited in a 401K retirement account.
The analysis of capital gains requires (1) more than one asset in a macro-
dynamic model and (2) careful attention to the workings of the asset market.
We take our cue from the old paper by Shell and Stiglitz (1967)1. In Shell
and Stiglitz, there are two capitals, perfect foresight, but savings behavior
is not based on individual utility maximization. In the present paper, we
analyze a two-capital production technology very much like that in Shell and
Stiglitz (1967). We replace the ad hoc consumption function of Shell-Stiglitz
with utility-maximizing individuals in the overlapping-generations model of
Diamond (1965) extended to allow for two capitals. We also assume that
capital, once installed, cannot be directly consumed.2 Therefore, investments
are irreversible allowing for the prices of used machines to fall below their
reproduction costs, i.e. for a Tobin￿ s q which is less than 1.
We will in a subsequent paper study the more general 2-capital technology
of Shell and Stiglitz, but here we focus on the very special (but revealing)
case in which the machines are perfect substitutes as factors of production
and have identical replacement costs if newly produced. Hence we refer to the
two capitals as, respectively, blue machines and red machines. However, we
allow used machinery to have market prices that depend on the machine color
(blue or red). Capitals are non-malleable: the color of a machine cannot be
altered. This assumption allows for the possibility of di⁄erent prices between
blue and red machines. We adopt discrete time and assume that individuals
live for two periods.
If the prices of blue and red machines are always equal, the model re-
1Also see, e.g., Shell, Sidrauski, and Stiglitz (1969), Caton and Shell (1971), Burmeister,
Caton, Dobell, and Ross (1973), Shell (1972), and Burmeister and Graham (1974).
2See Magill and Quinzii (2003).
2duces in essence to the Diamond model adjusted to incorporate irreversible
investment:
￿ In the steady state there is a unique overall capital to labor ratio, which
is stable.
￿ If the overall capital to labor ratio is su¢ ciently high, then the price
of used machinery is below its reproduction cost and there is no new
investment. Otherwise the prices of used machines equal their repro-
duction costs. Once the economy enters the range in which investment
is positive, it does not return to the no-investment regime.
If, however, the price of blue machines is allowed to di⁄er from that of
red machines, we have:
￿ The price of the lower-priced machine will become zero or negative in
￿nite time, revealing that this path is not a long-run perfect foresight
competitive equilibrium trajectory.
￿ On the unique competitive equilibrium trajectory in which expectations
are always ful￿lled, the price of red machines equals the price of blue
machines at every date.
2 The Model
In each period, there is a generation of identical, old consumers and a gen-
eration of identical, young consumers. Each young consumer inelastically
supplies one unit of labor. The old do not work. The labor force L grows at
the rate n ￿ 0, so we have
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt; (1)
3where Lt is the number of consumers born in year t = 0;1;::: . Consumers












t is consumption when young and xo
t is consumption when old.













where ￿ is a scalar between 0 and 1, K1
t > 0 and K2
t > 0 are, respectively,
the quantities of blue machines and red machines, Yt > 0 is undi⁄erentiated
output, Ct ￿ 0 is consumption, Z1
t ￿ 0 and Z2
t ￿ 0 are respectively gross
investment in blue machines and red machines, all at time t: Investment is
irreversible and capital goods are non-malleable (i.e. blue machines cannot
be turned into red ones, nor vice versa) since Zi
t ￿ 0. Let ￿ > 0 be the rate
of depreciation on each type of machinery:
K
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for i = 1;2: Denote by lower case letters quantities normalized by L, e.g.,



















for i = 1;2: Under competition, factors are rewarded by their marginal








￿￿1 > 0 (6)











￿ > 0; (7)
4where ri
t is the rental rate on type-i capital and wt is the wage rate. Of










￿￿1 = rt: (8)
We assume that individuals possess perfect foresight about price changes.
Hence equilibrium in the used machinery market requires that the rate of
return (including capital gains) on blue machines be equal to the rate of













where pi ￿ 0 is the current price of machine i in terms of the consumption











The consumer chooses (x
y
t;xo


















where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, "log" denotes the natural logarithm,
and st is savings. The consumer￿ s problem can be stated more succinctly:
max
st
log(wt ￿ st) + ￿ log(￿t+1st); (11)






Young consumers use their savings to buy capital that they will rent in period
t and sell in period t+1. In competitive equilibrium, the supply of machinery





















Consumption per head is always positive, so we can normalize prices
by the price of current consumption. Under competition, ￿rms will only








t) < 1, then z1
t = z2
t = 0: If max(p1
t;p2
t) = 1, then the ma-
chine with the lower price will not be produced. If p1
t = p2
t = 1, then the













> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
= 1 if p1
t > p2
t and zt > 0
2 [0;1] if p1
t = p2
t and zt > 0
= 0 if p1
t < p2
t and zt > 0
unde￿ned if zt = 0
: (14)
De￿nition 1 Given initial per capita capital stocks (k1
0;k2
0), a long-run















such that equations (7), (8) and (12), and the market-clearing conditions 10
and 13 are satis￿ed.
64 Steady State









From (4) and (13), we derive the overall steady-state capital stock per head,
















We see that (k1 + k2) and y are uniquely determined and positive but that
k1 and k2 are indeterminate. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 1 In the steady state, the overall capital to labor ratio (k1+k2)
and output per worker y are uniquely determined, but ￿ = k1=(k1 + k2) is
any number in [0;1]:
5 Existence and uniqueness of the competi-
tive equilibrium trajectory
Given initial endowments, we will show that there is a competitive equilib-





0 : First it is useful to
show that if gross investment is ever positive it will remain positive.
Proposition 2 If gross investment is strictly positive at time t; it will also
be strictly positive at time t + 1
Proof. If zt > 0 then max(p1
t;p2
t) = 1: Without loss of generality assume
that p1
t = 1: If p2
t = 1 the proof is trivial so consider p2
t < 1: Given this we
7have (1 ￿ ￿)k1
t +p2
t (1 ￿ ￿)k2
t <
￿
1+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(k1
t + k2
t)





















First note that the no-arbitrage condition 10 immediately implies that
since p1
t > p2








t ; which implies that p1
t+1 > p2
t+1: So it





































































After some rearranging and using k1
t+1+p2










t (1 ￿ ￿)k2
t
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t=0 such that p1
t = p2
t and the
market clearing condition (13) are satis￿ed is compatible with a competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Case 1. Suppose that
(1 ￿ ￿)k
1













then new investment is positive and we have p1
t = p2
t = 1: The arbitrage
condition is automatically satis￿ed and the dynamics reduce to the dynamics




















Case 2. Now suppose we have
(1 ￿ ￿)k
1




















































￿ : So it is a matter of time for the inequal-
ity to ￿ ip, and the economy moves to case 1, where it will stay by the previous
proposition.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium described in proposition 3 is unique.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Without loss of generality assume
that p1
t > p2














t : Since p1
t > p2













t+1; and then p1
t+2 > p2
t+2; and so on. Therefore, if any
new investment is made, it will be in capital 1 (blue machines).
Case 1. Suppose that
p
1


















































Case 2. Suppose we have
p
1

















There is no new investment, p1




t; i = 1;2. It is a
matter of time to move to Case 1, where the economy will stay. So we can
focus our attention in Case 1.
To rule out the possibility an equilibrium, we only need to show that
in ￿nite time p2 will become negative. Since p1
t = 1 for all t, the arbitrage





t ￿ 1): Note that the right hand side
is negative and bounded away from zero. So in ￿nite time p2 will become
negative.
106 Computed Examples - how long before the
bubble bursts?
Our numerical exercises are inspired in part by Atkinson (1969)3. The para-
meter values used in our computations are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Assumed Parameter Values
￿ ￿ ￿ n k1
0 . k2
0
0:4 0:6 0:55 0 1 5
In the 2-period-lifetime OG model we identify "youth" with the working
years and "old age" with the retirement years. Therefore, one period in the
OG model corresponds to roughly 20 years. So ￿ = 0:6 corresponds to an
annual discount factor on the order of 97:5%, while ￿ = 0:55 corresponds to
an annual depreciation rate of about 4%.
In Table 2 we display an e¢ cient, bubble-free growth path. The initial
overall capital to labor ratio, k1
0 +k2
0; is large, so the initial gross investments
are zero and initial prices are bellow unity: p1
0 = p2
0 = 0:170639376. The total
value of capital converges to its equilibrium steady-state value:, k1 + k2 =
0:083234658. There are no bubbles: p1
t = p2
t for t = 0;1;2;:::
In Figure 1, we present the evolution of (k1
t + k2
t): After 6 periods, or
about 120 years, the steady state is nearly achieved. In Figure 2, p1
t = p2
t
is plotted. In period zero, prices of used machines are less than 1 and only
in period 4 do they become 1. As we can see in Figure 3, there is no gross
investment as long as prices are smaller than 1. We plot the trajectories
of savings st (curve marked with squares) and gross investment zt (curve
marked circles). st declines with time, as total capital decreases. zt increases
sharply in periods 4 and 5 and and then quickly approaches its steady state
value.
3See especially pages 144-148.






0 6 0:170639376 0:460726 0
1 2:7 0:275519122 0:334756 0
2 1:215 0:444860901 0:243228 0
3 0:54675 0:718284888 0:176725 0
4 0:246038 1:000 0:128405 0:017688
5 0:110717 1:000 0:093297 0:043474
6 0:093297 1:000 0:087122 0:045139
7 0:087122 1:000 0:084768 0:045563
8 0:084768 1:000 0:083845 0:045699
9 0:083845 1:000 0:083478 0:045748
10 0:083478 1:000 0:083332 0:045767
11 0:083332 1:000 0:083274 0:045774
12 0:083274 1:000 0:083250 0:045777
13 0:083250 1:000 0:083241 0:045778
14 0:083241 1:000 0:083237 0:045778
15 0:083237 1:000 0:083235 0:045779
16 0:083236 1:000 0:083235 0:045779
17 0:083235 1:000 0:083235 0:045779
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saving (left axis) Gross Investment (right axis)
Figure 3: Evolution of savings and gross investment on the bubble-free path
For Table 3, we perturb the previous exercise. Instead of setting p1
0 = p2
0,
we allow for p2
0 to be slightly larger than p1
0. That is we introduce a positive
red-machine "bubble".
In Figure 4, the p1
t path is marked by circles, and the p2
t path is marked
by squares. Since p1
0 is smaller than p2
















0 1 5 0:170639000 0:170639451 0:460726 0
1 0:45 2:25 0:275517436 0:275519459 0:334756 0
2 0:2025 1:0125 0:444853339 0:444862414 0:243228 0
3 0:091125 0:455625 0:718250971 0:718291671 0:176725 0
4 0:041006 0:205031 0:999826513 1:000 0:128405 0:017692
5 0:018453 0:109956 0:999298119 1:000 0:098997 0:041219
6 0:008304 0:090699 0:996799366 1:000 0:089216 0:044676
7 0:003737 0:085491 0:98467151 1:000 0:085582 0:045455
8 0:001682 0:083926 0:925127357 1:000 0:084176 0:045709
9 0:000757 0:083476 0:631441715 1:000 0:083632 0:045853
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Figure 4: Bubble prices
So, for the asset market to clear, the capital gains on red machines must be
greater than the capital gains on blue machines. The bubble on red machines
must burst before period 10.
If the initial bubble is greater, then the bubble will burst more quickly.
For example, if p1
0 = 0:16 and p2
0 = 0:172767251 the bubble must burst by
period 3.
We have investigated economies with parameter values di⁄erent from
those given in Table 1. We have replaced ￿ = 0:55 with ￿ = 0:9; corre-
sponding to a yearly depreciation rate of 10%. The initial prices consistent
14with bubble-free competitive equilibrium are p1
0 = p2
0 = 0:767877191. In
period 1, we have p1
1 = p2
1 = 1:00 After 5 periods, (k1
t + k2
t) becomes close to
its steady state value (k1 + k2) = 0:08323. If we have a small bubble on red
machines, given by p1
0 = 0:767877 and p2
0 = 0:767877230; then by period 6
p1
t becomes negative. Hence the red machine bubble must burst by period
6.
It is not surprising that the higher is the depreciation rate the quicker the
bubble will burst. The larger are the depreciation rates, other things equal,
the smaller are the capital gains. Hence changes in the prices will have to be
even bigger to compensate for the di⁄erences in the yields on the machines,
leading to shorter lived bubbles. If the depreciation rate is 100% , there
would be no capital gains and there would be no room for perfect-foresight
bubbles.
7 Concluding Remarks
Blue machines are technologically identical to red machines. The central
planner and the representative in￿nitely-lived agent are indi⁄erent to the
color of machinery. The shadow price of a blue machine is equal to the
shadow price of a red machine on the optimal trajectory.
We investigate prices and capital gains (and losses) on blue machines and
red machines in a simple OG model. On the unique competitive path in
which expectations are always ful￿lled, the market price of blue machines
is always equal to the market price of red machines. If there are complete
futures markets in machinery, then this bubble-free path is the only one that
will be pursued. But we are talking here about a large (potentially in￿nite)
number of futures markets.
In the real world, futures markets extend out to only a few years at most.
In our computed examples, bubble-trajectories will eventually be revealed to
be disequilibrium paths, but only after decades or more. The question re-
15mains: Does the ownership economy steer away from bubbles that eventually
burst? If so, how is this accomplished? If not, what are the consequences for
public policy?
8 Biographical Note
Our particular model has important antecedents: (1) The technology is es-
sentially that of Shell-Stiglitz (1967)4 except that the present paper employs
discrete time and explicitly allows for irreversible capital so that Tobin￿ s q
can be less than unity.5 Except for the introduction of 2 capitals and the
irreversibility of investment, we are using the OG model of Diamond (1965)6.
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